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This paper contributes a preliminary analysis of the process of capitalist transformation 
in Arunachal Pradesh, one of the least studied regions of India. Primarily based on 
information collected through a field survey in eleven villages, the paper seeks to explain 
the nature and implications of institutional unevenness in the development of capitalism. 
Institutional diversity is not simply mapped across space; it is also manifested in the 
simultaneous existence of market and non-market institutions across the means of 
production within the same village or spatial context. In addition there is a continuous 
and complex interaction among these institutions which both shapes and is shaped by this 
incipient capitalist transformation. Against the near universal consensus of social 
theorists that non-market institutional forms and processes would decline with the 
expansion and consolidation of the capitalist economy, the evidence presented here 
suggests that institutional adaptation, continuity and hybridity are as much integral to 
the emergence of the market economy as are the processes of creation of new institutions 
and demise of others. There is no necessary correspondence between the emerging 
commercialisation of the different productive dimensions of the agrarian economy. These 
uneven processes of institutional diversity, hybridity and interdependence are deeply 
influenced by existing and emerging power relations. Primitive accumulation, which was 
thought to be an archaic feature of early capitalism, emerges as a continuing 
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‘Of course, infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this or that type of 
capitalist evolution are possible, and only hopeless pedants could set about 
solving the peculiar and complex problems arising merely by quoting this or that 







The transformation of pre-capitalist production relations in agriculture has 
attracted much scholarly attention over the past century.  It has been established that there 
is no standard, unilinear and inevitable path of transition to capitalism, even in European 
contexts (Byres, 1986). Scholars working on the agrarian transformation of Asian 
economies have noted the inherent danger of following a reductionist and narrow 
conceptualisation of agrarian transformation (Hart et. al, 1989; Hayami and Kikuchi, 
1981).  
 
In a recent debate, Bernstein has argued that the agrarian question, in the classical 
sense of the term - which, according to Byres (1996: 26) involves the ‘continuing 
existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of 
accumulation in both the countryside itself and more generally’- has already been solved 
or by-passed in most of the world and what remains as the agrarian question of the twenty 
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first century is essentially the agrarian question of labour
2. Commentators and scholars 
working on various dimensions of capitalist transformation in India, however, continue to 
note the relevance of the agrarian question (Byres, 1996; Harriss-White, 2008). Even 
though Bernstein’s key argument  - that the constraint on capitalist transformation 
imposed by stagnant agriculture has become redundant under globalisation (as easy 
access to global capital allows backward and transitional economies to develop 
independent of the capacity of domestic agriculture to generate surplus for industrial 
growth) appears to be true for globalising India - the accumulation process is only one of 
the dimensions of the agrarian question
3 (Akram-Lodhi, 1998). Moreover, there are still 
parts of the world where the agrarian economy has not been de-peasantised and 
commercialised and where a significant proportion of households could retreat to 
subsistence production without being destroyed – at least for a while - since they practise 
subsistence agriculture, pastoral economy, hunting and gathering (for food, fuel, 
medicinal, ceremonial and religious purposes and raw materials for craft), local 
redistributive trade and a wide range of 'craft' skills for use
4.  
 
There are two agrarian questions raised in the contemporary literature on 
capitalist transformation and agricultural development: the first, classical question 
‘concerns the capitalist transformation of agriculture and its many trajectories and 
distributional consequences’, while the second concerns ‘the economic roles that 
agriculture must play to service the development of the rest of the economy’, during the 
very process of the first agrarian transition (Harriss-White, 2008). In the context of the 
wide variations in the contemporary pathways of transition to capitalist agriculture, the 
salience of the supply of labour and of savings for the development of the non-
agricultural economy and the widely acknowledged phenomena of the survival of the 
                                                 
2  Henry Bernstein argues that ‘[d]ue to land reforms and other dynamics of capitalist restructuring and 
accumulation in the post-war period,…predatory landed property had largely vanished as a significant 
economic and political force by the end of the 1970s. This was one marker of the end of the agrarian 
question of capital on a world scale’, and hence ‘there is no longer an agrarian question of (global) capital, 
nor of “national” capitals (and states) in poorer countries today’. What remains is ‘crisis of labour as a 
crisis of reproduction’ (Bernstein, 2006: 452-3, emphasis in original). The case of Arunachal is certainly an 
outlier and the essay will reveal widespread relations of predatory landed property. 
 
3 The three significant ‘problematics’ of Byre’s agrarian question are ‘accumulation’, ‘production’ and 
‘politics’ (Bernstein, 1996). While the first refers to the understanding of the ‘extent to which agriculture 
can act as a basis for surplus accumulation, the second explores the extent to which capitalism has been 
able to transform the countryside, the forms that it takes, the barriers which may impede its development’ 
(Byres, 1991). The third problematic, ‘politics’ involves ‘the impact of political forces and forms on the 
evolution of rural change explicit in both the accumulation and production problematics’ (Akram-Lodhi, 
1998: 38). Akram-Lodhi (1998: 146) argues that since Byres associates agrarian transition with overall 
development of capitalism and its ultimate dominance, ‘agrarian transition may occur without necessarily 
requiring changes within the individual spheres of accumulation, production and politics’. Thus, capitalist 
transformation may be facilitated through changes in rural production and politics, even without any 
apparent net contribution to accumulation being made by agriculture.  
 
4 In the specific case of Arunachal Pradesh that we discuss here, the skills include spinning and weaving, 
the production of alcohol along with an elaborate culture of domestic manufacture using stone, wood, 
bamboo and bark for artefacts in agriculture, in the maintenance of paths, communications, water supplies 
and sanitation, housing and shelter, and domestic utensils. 
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‘peasant’ family farm alongside capitalist production relations - or of the capitalist 
incorporation of petty commodity production in many parts of the developing world -  the 
study of the agrarian transformation of Arunachal Pradesh is one attempt to understand 
the nature of this complex  transition process
5. Arunachal is the mountainous border state 
situated in the extreme northeast corner of India. To analyse this transition, as elaborated 
in the subsequent sections, requires the incorporation of the various historical, ecological 
and institutional specificities of the state and their inter-relationships. However, three 
significant dimensions of the agrarian economy of Arunachal Pradesh deserve special 
mention at the outset: the ecological specificities of mountain agriculture
6; the 
institutional complexity underlying the use of and access to the various forces of 
production such as land and labour; and the historical role of the state as the prime mover 
of agrarian transformation. Thus, power, politics and the role of the state, become the 
central focus of this analysis.  
 
The agrarian transformation of Arunachal Pradesh also generates interesting 
questions  which have relevance beyond the immediate and specific context of the region 
under study. When a relatively isolated, subsistence-oriented, nature-based economy, 
where most of the crucial means of production, such as land and forests, are collectively 
owned, is integrated into the capitalist production system, what kind of an agrarian 
transition results? Are there aspects of the transition process from ‘pre-capitalist’ to 
capitalist mode of production that are unique to such a region? What role do the 
ecological variables, such as steep, high altitude landforms play in these specificities?  
How do institutions change in this transformation of communal agrarian systems? How 
do the institutional specificities shape the transformation process? 
 
This paper contributes a preliminary analysis of the agrarian element in the 
capitalist transformation of one of the least studied regions of India. We have used 
secondary information obtained from a variety of sources along with information 
collected through a field survey in eleven villages of Arunachal Pradesh, during late 
2007
7. Our object here is to explore and start to explain the extent of institutional 
                                                 
5 The purpose here is not to establish the extent to which capitalist transformation has already taken place; 
rather the emphasis is on forms and processes through which agrarian transition is taking place in the State.  
Salam (2007, 2008), on the basis of household data from West Kameng district, from which he has 
analysed the organisation of labour using the labour exploitation criterion (E-criterion) pioneered by Utsa 
Patnaik (Patnaik, 1976), has argued that capitalist production relations has already made significant inroads 
in rural Arunachal Pradesh.  
 
6 The total geographical area of Arunachal Pradesh is 8,374 thousand hectares. Of the total reported area 
under land utilisation about 94 per cent is covered by forest, and about 12 percent is under permanent snow 
covers and glaciers. Mountain specificities, such as inaccessibility, fragility, marginality and diversity, have 
been found to have significant implications for the local economies (Jodha, 2001). 
 
7 The villages were selected purposively from five districts of Arunachal Pradesh so as to reflect the diverse 
ecological conditions and levels of economic development within the State. For practical and security 
reasons, the eastern most districts of Arunachal Pradesh have been excluded from the study. The study 
covered the Western districts of Tawang and West Kameng, and the districts of Lower Subansiri, West 
Siang and East Siang in Central Arunachal Pradesh. Information on village institutions was collected on the 
basis of 76 semi-structured, open-ended questionnaires mostly through interpreters. In each of the villages 
information was collected from at least three informants, including the gaon burah or village chief. Further 
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unevenness in the development of capitalism, which we discovered through an enquiry 
into the penetration of markets. Institutional diversity is not simply mapped across space; 
it is also manifested in the simultaneous existence of market and non-market institutions 
constituting the forces of production within the same village or spatial context. We 
examine the forces and relations of production one by one to show the continuous and 
complex interaction among these institutions which both shape and are shaped by the 
incipient capitalist transformation of the agrarian economy. 
 
Land Relations 
One of the fundamental aspects of the classic agrarian question is how private 
property rights are created in agricultural land.  Property rights are important in 
understanding agrarian relations because they define and condition the use of the means 
of production
8. The formation of property rights in Arunachal Pradesh has undergone 
substantial change over the last half-century. Historically, land ownership was collective, 
although animals, tools and implements were privately owned. Many forms of ownership 
of different types of resources at different times have been noticed in aboriginal and tribal 
contexts.  
 
The traditional economic base for tribal communities was slash and burn 
agriculture, supplemented by hunting and gathering, although handicrafts and barter 
exchanges with Tibet and the plains of Assam, were also mentioned in many colonial 
accounts. Commenting upon the land relations among the Nyshi tribe practicing slash-
and-burn agriculture, prior to 1960s, Mishra (1983: 1842) writes: 
 
‘During the period of cultivation, and before being abandoned to the forest a plot 
of field remains under exclusive possession of the family. After it has been abandoned, it 
becomes the common property of the village…Thus, no sooner than a family’s private 
right of exclusive possession ceases, the village community’s exclusive property rights 
supervenes and remains in force until the plot is again opened by a family after the 
vegetation cover has had time to regenerate’. 
 
Although this description was applicable to a number of tribes, the conception of 
village community varied considerably. While in some areas the institution of 
chieftainship was well developed and individuals derived their rights of ownership from 
the village chief, as in the Nocte and Wancho tribes, in many areas the village-council, 
                                                                                                                                                 
detailed information about various aspects of cultivation was collected from two cultivator households in 
each of the villages to substantiate the village-level information. Along with 33 village interviews, we 
talked to 13 state officials in agriculture, horticulture, local government, the food administration and 
planning as well as parastatal authorities (Buddhist Gompa monks) and university researchers. We also 
interviewed 30 local and migrant traders, contractors, engineers and businessmen operating in the non-farm 
economy. 
 
8 As pointed out by Furubotn and Pejovich, property rights are not relations between men and things, but 
rather such rights should be seen as ‘the sanctioned behavioural relations among men that arise from the 
existence of things and pertain to their use’ (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972: 1139).  
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consisting of all adult male members was the basic institution of decision-making, 
conflict resolution and collective action
9 (Misra, 1979; Das, 1995; Dutta, 2003).  
 
In these tribal economic formations the scope of inequality was limited, as the 
land area cultivated was invariably constrained by the amount of family labour and also 
by the practices of reciprocity and redistribution
10.  So far as the ‘traditional’ mechanisms 
for resource distribution and conflict-resolution were concerned, encounters with colonial 
rule and other state structures
11 shaped the role and functioning of these traditional 
orders. For example, the payment of posa
12, a payment which was made to the chiefs by 
the Ahom kings and later on by the British - against the guarantee that villages in the 
plains would not be raided for goods or slaves- created a degree of differentiation among 
the tribal population. This was reaffirmed when the payments were made in money and 
when ‘trade fairs’ were organised at the border posts to encourage the tribes to take part 
in market transactions. Although these early encounters with colonialism created change 
within the tribal social formations
13, by and large, land and forests remained under 
                                                 
9 By and large the traditional village-level institutions in Arunachal Pradseh can be categorized into three 
categories: a) those within an hierarchical structure under the Buddhist monasteries particularly found 
among the Buddhist tribes of West Kameng and Tawang districts of western Arunachal Pradesh; b) the 
chieftaincies found in eastern-most corner of the state and c) the republican village-councils among the 
tani-group of tribes in central Arunachal Pradesh. Elwin’s ‘Democracy in NEFA’, contains a detailed, 
though not always accurate, account of these village institutions. His basic argument was that these 
institutions, by and large are democratic, and they should be served as the basis of the governance 
structures.  For relatively recent descriptive accounts of these institutions see Talukdar (2002); Roy Burman 
(2002); Pandey et al (1999). 
 
10 For a discussion how the reproduction of the population and its governing institutions were intimately 
related to the economic reproduction of the family and that of the community, see Mishra (1983). 
 
11 Tribes of the region had maintained contacts with the Ahom rulers of Assam, the monasteries of Tibet 
and Bhutan. Pre-colonial tribal social formations, though relatively isolated, had been interacting with these 
neighbouring economies for centuries (Sikdar, 1982; Salam, 2008;,  Dutta and Jha, 2002). 
 
12 During the reign of the Ahom ruler Pratap Singh (1603-1641AD), the ‘Akas, the Dufflas, the Miris, the 
Abors’ were granted the right of levying posha which apart from annual collection of goods in specified 
areas included labour-service of the Assamese pykes for which the ryots were given corresponding 
remission from the state’s revenue demand. With the advent of the British rule, attempts were made to fix 
the amount of commodities to be paid to each of the tribes. The British, who termed the posha as 
‘blackmail, blackmail levy or compensation levy for blackmail’, ‘within a short period of 25 years of their 
rule, commuted it into money terms and made the tribal chief and leaders, agree to receive the amount each 
year directly from the Deputy Commissioner’s office’ (Mishra, 1983: 1838). Other scholars have viewed 
posa differently, such as a ‘rent’ for using the plains that belonged to the tribal people. Haimendorf, for 
example, writes ‘[T]he officers of government had generally considered posa as a form of tribute with 
which in the early days of British rule the hillmen had been bought off from raiding the plains, but I am 
convinced that in this they were mistaken and posa was really a kind or rent for land belonging to the Miris 
and other hillmen by right’. (Haimendorf, 1982: 27). 
 
13 For a discussion on the impact of the colonial rule on the tribal economies of present-day Arunachal 
Pradesh see Sikdar (1982). While noting the enormous impact of the colonial intervention on trade and 
commerce, Sikdar (1982:23) notes that ‘[t]he political sensitiveness of the area because of its proximity 
with Tibet, China and Burma, the very factor which enhanced the economic significance of the region, also 
narrowed down the chances of investment by capitalist entrepreneurs. The restricted pattern of trade could 
not obviously initiate any structural change in the economy and hence ruled out the possibility of the 
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collective control and the basic features of the tribal economies remained unaltered till 
the Indian government started establishing and consolidating administrative structures 
during the post-independence period. After the Indo-China border conflict of 1962, there 
was a perceptible change in the attitude of the government regarding administration of 
this mountainous border region known as the North-Eastern Frontier Agency
14 (Map 1).  
 
Limitations in analysing the agrarian structure exclusively through land and its 
relations have been pointed out by many scholars
15 (White, 1989: 19; Harriss-White, 
1999: 382). However, land continues to provide a useful entry point to study agrarian 
relations. However, the available secondary information is grossly inadequate to draw 
any definitive conclusion regarding the changing agrarian structure in Arunachal Pradesh. 
In the absence of data on ownership holdings, inferences must be made about the 
distribution agricultural land from looking at the changes in the distribution of 
operational holdings (Table 1). In 2000-01, as per the Agricultural Census data, 14 
percent of the holdings were marginal holdings and their share in area was less than 2 per 
cent. In total, holdings of less than 5 hectares in size accounted for nearly 33 percent of 
holdings. By contrast, medium and semi-medium holdings together had a share of 62 
percent. Over the period 1970-71 to 2000-01, there has been a decline in the share of 
large and medium sized holdings while that of smaller size-classes has registered an 
increase. So the most prominent feature of the agrarian structure is the move towards 
smaller holdings
16. The fragmentation of holdings due to family/clan-partition, partial or 
complete abandonment of large jhum
17 plots in favour of smaller permanent holdings 
might have caused the decline in the presence of large size holdings.  
                                                                                                                                                 
emergence of a new “comprador” class, The invasive forces had no option but to seek the cooperation of 
the ruling chiefs’. 
 
14  After India’s defeat in the Indo-China war of 1962, the Nehru-Elwin policy of gradual integration of the 
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), often termed as ‘isolationist’ and ‘a legacy of the colonial policy’ 
towards the region, came under severe criticism (Baruah, 2003b: 919). The post-1962 period witnessed a 
rapid expansion and consolidation of administration in the region. In 1972, NEFA was renamed Arunachal 
Pradesh and was made a Union Territory. In 1987, Arunachal Pradesh became the 24
th State of the India 
(Luthra, 1993; Govt of Arunachal Pradesh, 2006). 
 
15 While agrarian structure is conventionally understood as the distribution of landholdings across classes, 
the degree of concentration of agricultural land and its tenurial arrangements, a more inclusive definition of 
the term includes ‘structures of commerce, of exchange arrangements in land, water and labour, as well as 
changing ideologies of gender, caste and ethnicity’ (Rogaly, 1999: 358). The access to land, however, is of 
critical importance in understanding these multiple aspects of agrarian structure, and hence we start the 
discussion of agrarian structure through the conventional parameters. Even here, the conclusions are 
necessarily tentative, because of the low reliability of the official figures.  
 
16 The average size of holding has declined from 6.19 ha in 1970-71 to 3.69 ha in 2000-01, partly showing 
increasing population pressure on the agricultural land. Within the different size classes, the decline has, 
however, not been uniform. In the large size class for example, the average size increased, during 1970-71 
to 1980-81, thereafter it has declined steadily till 1995-96. Between 1995-96 and 2000-01, there has been a 
noteworthy increase in the average size of the large size-class of holdings. The average size of holdings in 
the marginal, small and semi-medium size classes has declined during 1990-91 to 2000-01. 
 
17 In northeast India, the agricultural practice of shifting cultivation is also known as jhum cultivation. Jhum 
generally involves clearing a patch of forest land, cultivating it for two to three years and then abandoning 
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Source: Arunachal Human Development Report 2005 
 
Further catalysts of differentiation include the shift of manpower from 
rural/agricultural occupations to urban/ non-agricultural occupations; increasing 
population pressure on fertile plain land which is in scarce supply and the resulting 
demographic differentiation; and the influx of migrant labourers as tenants (Mishra, 
2006). However, given the diffusion of horticulture
18 and the drive by the neo-rich to 
occupy land, the underreporting of area under the large-category of holdings is also a 
distinct possibility (Mishra, 2001; 2002b). There exist considerable inter-district 
variations in the distribution of operational holdings by size-class. The share of marginal 
holdings (under 1 ha) in the districts, for example, varies from a high of 70.79 per cent in 
Tawang to a low of 1.58 per cent in Upper Subansiri district.  
 
So far as land-use is concerned, the available secondary data makes it clear that 
there has been a steady decline in the extent of shifting cultivation in the state
19. The shift 
from jhum to permanent cultivation is generally associated with the move from common 
property to a private property regime. In all the eleven villages under study some form of 
                                                                                                                                                 
it for 10-20 years to allow the natural vegetation to grow back and the soil to regain its fertility. In recent 
years the jhum cycle has been reduced to 2-3 years in many parts of the region (Ramakrishnan, 1992; also 
see Das, 2006). 
 
18 In recent years, there has been much emphasis by various government agencies on the growth of 
horticulture in the state. The New Agricultural Policy (2001) of Arunachal Pradesh has laid special 
emphasis on horticulture as a way of modernising agriculture. By 2004-05 the total production of 
horticultural crops reached nearly 140,605 metric tonnes per annum and the total area under horticulture 
was 67,584 hectares (Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, 2005).  
 
19 The steady decline in the proportion of area under jhum cultivation during 1970-71 to 1990-91 seems to 
have slowed down during 1990-91 to 1995-96 (Mishra, 2006). 
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private property over agricultural land has already emerged (Table 2). The property rights 
over land are better described as preferential or limited property rights
20 as control of the 
community institutions has not been completely destroyed. In particular the right to 
transfer land persists. Except in urban areas, and in some villages having weak 
community institutions land cannot be transferred to those falling outside the moral 
economy of the village, although the membership rules exhibit variations at times. 
Generally non-tribals are not permitted to own any land. Even tribals belonging to 
elsewhere within the State are also not allowed to buy land in some cases. There is a clear 
preference for people belonging to the same tribe and the same or nearby villages. In two 
of the villages in Tawang district, most of the agricultural land is even considered to be 
the property of the Tawang monastery. Monks and gaon burahs alike reported that 
farmers are considered to be tenants ‘enjoying’ a long-term lease.  
 
Table: 1 
Size Class wise Distribution of Operational Holdings (Arunachal Pradesh): 
1970-71 to 2000-01 
(in percentages) 
Source: Agricultural Census, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Various Years 
Share in Total Holdings 






No Area  No Area  No Area  No Area No  Area No  Area No  Area 
Marginal  7.67 0.71 9.69 0.99 16.53  2.25 17.18  2.67 17.38  2.87 19.26  3.03 14.04 1.90 
Small  11.96  2.77 18.25  4.36 20.75  6.89 18.87  7.02 18.40  7.51 19.37  7.62 18.78 6.73 
Semi-
Medium 
25.91 11.63 27.42 12.75 28.13 17.81 31.17 21.80 32.01 24.00 28.97 22.36 34.05 24.57 
Medium  36.40 35.00 27.32 28.34 28.10 38.87 27.01 40.17 27.16 42.13 26.65 43.32 27.80 43.49 
Large  18.06 49.89 17.33 53.57 6.48  34.18 5.77  28.33 5.04  23.50 5.75  23.67  5.33 23.30 
All  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 100 
 
Although the privatisation of ownership rights over land is the most widely 
noticed dimension of the transitional phase in Arunachal Pradesh, it is important to note 
that collective or communal property rights have also acquired complex and diverse 
context-specific operational meanings. The land under shifting cultivation, generally 
described as under ownership by the whole village community and over which 
individuals are supposed to have use rights alone, is in fact owned by specific clans and 
by individual households
21 (Bordoloi, 1998). Actually existing property rights structures 
                                                 
20 ‘Limited transfer rights’ refers to temporary transfer rights under mortgage, use rights without 
inheritance rights, inheritance rights without rights to alienate etc., while ‘preferential transfer rights’ refers 
to transfer within family, clan or tribe (See Gibbs and Bromley, 1991 and Hanna et al, 1995).. 
 
21 In West Kameng district we came across a case where an entire patch of forest on a hill had been 
purchased from the village council at least twenty-five years ago. In many parts of the State, we have 
noticed conflicting claims of ownerships over forest lands - the heads of village institutions typically stress 
the collective ownership of these lands, but individuals and households point out the inherited property as 
theirs. 
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in Arunchal are known to lie along the entire continuum between the two extremes of 
collective and private property rights. 
 
Table: 2 




Features Alternatives  No  of 
Villages 
Only Settled Cultivation  09  1. Type  of  Cultivation 






2. Major  Crops  Grown 
Vegetables 11 
Privately Owned (informally) but restrictions 
imposed by village institutions on land sales to 
outsiders  
09  3. Land  Ownership 
Privately Owned (informally) but considered to be the 
property of Gompa (Buddhist Monastry) 
02 
Paid to the Village Council  02 
Paid to Gompa (as rent)  02 
4.  Land Revenue payment to 
non-state authorities 




Few   03 
5. Land  sales  (agricultural 
land) 
Not at all  04 
Frequent 05 
Few   03 
6. Land  leasing 
Not at all  03 
Very High  00 
Low 08 
7. Landlessness 
Not present at all  03 
For most of agricultural land  06 
Available, but for few  01 
8. Availability  of  Irrigation 
Not available  04 
By state government departments  04 
Provided by the state and managed by village council  01 
9. Irrigation  provision  and 
management 
Provided and managed by the village council  02 
Entirely private  04 
Entirely collective  02 
10.  Ownership of Grazing land 
Partly private and partly collective  05 
Source: Field Survey,2007 
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the history of emergence of private ownership is uneven 
across the various villages studied. In general permanent cultivation seems to have a 
longer history in the western Tawang region than in other areas (other than the notable 
exception of the Apatani valley towards the centre of Arunachal Pradesh). This may be 
for two reasons. Firstly, being a high altitude region, the natural regeneration of 
vegetation cover takes a longer period in this region than other parts of the state. 
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Secondly, the consolidation of land administration under the Tawang Gompa
22, which 
involved a meticulous recording of land titles and rents and tributes to be paid to the 
monastery, might have facilitated the early shift to permanent cultivation with individual 
land rights. These individual rights were, of course, not absolute. In majority of the cases 
the ultimate ownership rights over agricultural land rested with the Gompa and the 
cultivators were considered to be tenants
23. 
 
In two of the villages, rent or land revenue is paid to the Gompa, while in two 
others, land revenue is paid to the village council. In rest of these villages, annual 
payment to the village council is reported but the nature of these payments was more in 
the nature of a household contribution to the village fund rather than land revenue
24. The 
sale of agricultural land was reported from all but three of the villages under study. In 
five villages, land sales were reported to be ‘common’. Thus, in the absence of a formal 
private property rights regime with the exclusive backing of state power, an informal 
system of recognition and transfer of private property rights over land has already 
emerged in parts of rural Arunachal Pradesh. 
 
Similarly, land leasing was reported in eight of the study villages, in five of which 
it was described as common. However, substantial differences were discovered in the 
significance and frequency of land-lease transactions across those villages where the 
existence of this market was reported. This is at variance with the official statistics. 
According to the Agricultural Census data, in 2000-01, 99 per cent of holdings in the 
State were self-operated. This is a clear case of underreporting (or extraordinarily rapid 
and deep change). Micro level field research has revealed that a land-lease market has 
already developed in parts of the state, with labourers from neighbouring states and 
countries migrating to the rural areas as tenants and wageworkers under contract (Roy 
and Kuri, 2001; Mishra, 2002a, 2002b).  Landlessness was reported in eight of the 
villages, although its extent was not very high
25.  
 
Of the seven villages where irrigation facilities were available, in four they were 
provided by the state, in two they were provided by the village council, and in one of the 
villages they were provided by the state but were managed by the village council. 
Similarly, the ownership of grazing land varied across villages. It ranged from being 
                                                 
22 A Gompa is a Buddhist monastery or hermitage.Tawang Gompa, one of the largest and oldest monastries 
in India. 
 
23 A lump-sum grant by the state government to the monastery has resulted in significant reduction in the 
amount of rent paid by the farmers, but not in its elimination. 
 
24 While land revenue is assessed on the basis of the amount of land cultivated or the amount produced, 
household tax is a fixed (usually annual) payment levied on the households.  
 
25 This is consistent with other field research. The extent of landlessness, the few micro-level studies 
indicate, varies considerably- from 30 per cent in the densely populated Apatani valley in Lower Subansiri 
district to around 10 per cent in West Kameng (Mishra, 2002a) and five per cent in Papumpare district (Roy 
and Kuri, 2001). 
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entirely privately owned in four of the villages to entirely collectively owned in five of 






Features Alternatives  No  of 
Villages 
Entirely private  03 
Entirely collective  03 
1.  Ownership of Forest 
Mixed 05 
High 03 
Medium   03 




No clear information  01 
3.  Restrictions imposed by village councils on collection 
of NTFPs (Non-timber forest products) 
Not applicable (entirely 
private) 
03 
Strong collective regulation 
and monitoring 
03 
Weak collective regulation 
and monitoring 
02 
No clear regulation  03 
4.  Exclusion of migrants/ outsiders/ late-comers from 
the collection and use of forest products 
Not applicable  03 
Yes 08  5.  Market for forest products 
No 03 
Source: Field Survey, 2007 
 
Forest 
This institutional diversity extends to forest ownership and management as well. 
In Arunachal Pradesh nearly 61 percent of forest land (categorised as ‘unclassed forest’) 
is in the hands of village communities and clans
26, but the effective control of these 
forests varies greatly among the tribal communities. Unconstrained individual property 
rights over land coexist, often in the same village, with collective rights in forests. 
However, irrespective of the precise nature of the property rights regime operating on the 
ground, there is an unmistakable tendency towards de facto privatisation of the ownership 
or at least of use rights over forests, some of which are now fenced, with state support 
and subsidy. Property rights over forests vary from being entirely private to entirely 
collective, and in five of the study villages while the forests near the villages have been 
privatised there still remain some forest, which are collectively owned. In contrast, in 
three of the villages the communities collectively owned forests. The extent to which 
there is effective monitoring of the collectively owned forests also shows a great deal of 
diversity. At least in three villages restrictions have been imposed upon the collection of 
non-timber forest products. Similarly, in five villages, rules concerning restrictions on the 
rights of outsiders and latecomers over forest products have been formulated. In three of 
these villages these new rules have been found to be strictly implemented and monitored 
                                                 
26 As per the State of Forest Report, 2005, out of the total recorded forest area of 51,540 km
2, which is 
61.55 per cent of the total geographical area of the Arunachal Pradesh, Reserve Forests constitute 20.46 per 
cent, Protected Forest 18.49 per cent and Unclassed Forest 61.05 per cent (Forest Survey of India, 2008). 
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by the village council. It is clear from the survey is that in the majority of the villages 




Our survey shows that family labour, exchange labour and wage labour in 
agriculture coexist in all the study villages
27. Wage labour is found to be the dominant 
mode of labour organisation in agriculture only in three of them. Exchange labour is still 
significant in a majority of villages. Labour exchange practices were found to exist in 
fairly complex and varied forms across the study villages. In the past, the most common 
form of labour mobilisation used to take the form of generalised cooperative labour 
sharing, where the entire village/clan worked as a single unit. In such a collective 
mobilisation of labour, reciprocity was generalised and monitoring was a collective 
responsibility, often institutionalised through the village councils led by the gaon burah, 
or the chief. Specific labour sharing arrangements, on the other hand, are agreed upon by 
two or more households, independent of the other households in the village or clan. There 
has been a gradual decline in the former and it was reported that generalised labour 
sharing has been largely limited to work related to religious and social festivals, and, in 
few cases, the creation and maintenance of village commons. Two different forms of 
specific labour sharing practices could be distinguished. In the first case, which can be 
termed an open-ended specific labour sharing arrangement, two or more households 
combine their resources (primarily labour, but the practice may include implements and 
draft animals as well) to carry out farm and forest-related activities. The second form of 
specific labour sharing is a limited liability arrangement, where two or more households 
exchange a mutually agreed number of working days in agricultural or non-agricultural 
work, such as house construction. Here the range of commitment and cooperation is 
generally narrower than that in open-ended arrangements, although both altruistic 
motivations and elements of patronage are not altogether absent
 28. Both these forms of 
specific labour sharing were noticed in the villages, but the second case is increasingly 
becoming the standard practice. Labour sharing, specifically in the changing context, is 
not independent of the relative resource endowment position of the household. The 
capacity to mobilise ‘community labour’, which is particularly important in building 
houses, making terraces and the clearing of forests, depends on the quality and quantity 
of food and liquor that the host can offer.  
 
The shift of a section of manpower to non-agricultural occupations and also to the 
urban, administrative centres has contributed to the transformation of labour relations in 
the villages. Apart from the fact that this has led to shortage of manpower in the labour-
intensive farming operations, such as jhum, it has put tribal labour institutions under great 
stress. As the relatively skilled, better-educated members of the labour force migrate 
                                                 
27 The organisation of family labour varies between jhum and wet rice cultivation. Agricultural operations 
are gendered and women contribute substantially to the production process, particularly in jhum. 
 
28 These findings were broadly similar to those of earlier findings by one of the authors in West Kameng 
district (Mishra, 2004). 
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outside the village, the mechanisms for collective labour mobilisation that were premised 
on voluntary labour contributions from all able bodied people has nearly collapsed. The 
effort in some villages to impose fines for non-contribution has led to a situation, where 
the rich and the well-to-do people have been able to monetise their contribution to the 
collective labour pool. 
 
The emergence of a casual non-farm labour market in parts of the State has also 
transformed labour relations in many ways (Mishra, 2006). Seasonal migration for work 
in road construction, permanent labour contracts involving migrant labourers (mainly 
from Assam, Bangladesh and Nepal) and tribal land owners, piece rate contracts in rice 
cultivating areas, credit-labour interlinkage—all these are fast becoming part of the 
changing labour relations in this region. The evolution of labour sharing also denotes a 
gradual movement from collective labour to wage labour arrangements
29. To sum up, 
while family labour continues to remain significant, there is a great deal of diversity in 
labour relations as well. However, these ‘transitional’ forms of labour relations should 
not necessarily be viewed as ‘points on a linear trajectory leading inexorably to single-
stranded wage-labour arrangements’ (Hart, 1989: 36). As of now, from our field 
discussions about the recent history of labour arrangements, we are led to conclude that 
the various transitional forms and the straightforward wage labour contracts coexist 




Sl. No.  Features  Alternatives  No of Villages 
Exits 11  1.  Casual wage labour in agriculture/ forest 
Does not exist  00 
Exits 11  2. Family  labour 
Does not exist  00 
Exists and significant  07 
Exists but declining  02 
3. Exchange  Labour 
Does not exist any longer  02 
Exists 10  4.  Non-farm casual labour 
Does not exist  01 
Source: Field Survey, 2007 
 
Other agrarian resources and markets 
 
The institutional features discussed so far are not found in a uniform or 
coordinated pattern. There has been a rapid growth of markets for agricultural inputs and 
                                                 
29 In a field-survey in West Kameng district, Mishra (2002a) investigated the relative importance of work 
sharing and wage employment within agricultural and forest related activities in different villages and 
across the size-classes by examining the percentage of working days spent on them. It was found that wage 
labour arrangements have a relatively higher presence in villages having inferior land quality as well as 
lower per capita operated land. The changing labour-use patterns have very clear gender implications as 
well. This was both because of out migration and diversification of the male labour force to non-farm 
occupations. In interior villages, labour sharing is a process in which both men and  women participated 
equally. But in villages nearer to urban centres, when the men take  non-farm work, the burden of 
sustaining agriculture and also participating in labour sharing arrangements falls on women. 
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outputs. In our field survey, we found that agricultural produce is marketed in all but one 
of the study villages. In eight of the ten villages where agricultural output produce is 
marketed, the sale of output was reported to be regular (Table 5). This does not yet imply 
more than sporadic and fragmented market exchange
30. At the same time non-market 
institutional arrangements continue to work in a variety of ways. A significant portion of 
the surplus continues to be exchanged through barter, particularly in relatively interior 
villages, at rates fixed by custom or mediated by known market prices. A portion of the 
produce is also spent in gifting, ritualistic or customary payments to friends, relatives, 
subordinates and superiors as well as in kind payments for labour exchange. 
 
 One factor contributing to the complexity of the institutional arrangements is that 
there is hardly any correlation between physical remoteness and the lack of emergence of 
private property, or between physical accessibility and the weakening of non-market 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Firstly, the privatisation of land ownership rights does not necessarily mean the 
existence or emergence of a land market. For example in four villages with clear private 
ownership rights over land no land market operates and in many others land sales were 
reported to be sporadic. The rights to alienate are not considered a part of the private 
rights of the individual landowner. Land sales are necessarily subject to the consent of the 
gaon burah or village chief. Thus, there is a clear disjunction between the right to inherit  
and the right to sell. The moral and political authority of the village does not simply 
disappear as a result of the emergence of individual rights over agricultural land. In some 
cases, the land/forest is privately owned, but people can forage for building materials, 
NTFP and firewood. Often there is reported to be no restriction on hunting on privately 
owned forests.  
 
Secondly, although the land-lease market has been reported to be operating in as 
many as eight of the study villages, an important distinction has to be drawn between two 
kinds of land leasing. The first is the type of land leasing that has emerged within the 
clan/village community in response to some out-migration to urban or non-agricultural 
occupations. Here the primary objective is often, but not always, to retain inheritance 
claims. So the terms of lease are unspecified and ambiguous. The other kind of land 
leasing is with tenants from outside the State (mainly from Assam) or outside the country 
(Nepalese migrant labourers in Western Arunachal Pradesh and Bangladeshi migrants in 
East Siang and other districts). The incidence and frequency of such land leasing depends 
on a number of factors such as the availability of land for labour-intensive wet rice 
cultivation and accessibility and not simply on the degree of ‘commercialisation of 
agriculture’.  
 
Thirdly, the ‘commercialisation of agriculture’ and production for the market does 
not necessarily mean dependence on wage labour. The overwhelming importance of 
family labour was confirmed in all the study villages irrespective of the type of 
cultivation (jhum or wet rice cultivation), crops produced, property rights over land and 
                                                 
30 An earlier field investigation in West Kameng district by Mishra (2002a) also supports this. 
Marketisation of agricultural produce is more pronounced in fruits and vegetables than in cereals.   
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extent of marketisation of output. However, in the three villages in East Siang district, 
close to the town of Pasighat, where the sale of output in markets is more frequent than in 
other villages,the dominant form of labour organisation, other than that of family labour, 
is tenant rather than wage labour. Otherwise long–term, tied labour contracts with outside 
labour (in many cases illegal foreign migrant labour) seem to be the dominant mode of 
labour contract for many of the tribal landowners. Commercialisation and market 
participation has created conditions for new forms of bondage and unfreedom, hitherto 
unknown in the tribal context
31. 
 
Although wage labour was reported in the majority of villages, the incidence of 
landlessness among the tribal population itself was typically low. Landlessness is the 
distinctive feature of non-Arunachalee migrant households, who, in any case, whether 
Indian or not, do not have the right to own land in Arunachal Pradesh. Thus, a significant 
commercialisation of the output market is found in the absence of well-known processes 
of depeasantisation and local differentiation
32. In certain villages in Tawang district, 
where agricultural production continues to be largely for subsistence, there are, however, 
early signs of differentiation. A stratum of local rural society has started working on road 
and other construction activities, mainly for local tribal contractors and against wage 
advances
33. At present this is confined to non-agricultural seasons and is viewed by those 
concerned more as a livelihood supplement rather than as entry to the non-farm labour 
force to which it is likely to be a prelude. But their increasing dependence on wage 
advances to meet consumption requirements, combined with declining productivity in 
agriculture
34 could lead towards their proletarianisation.   
 
 
                                                 
31 Forms of bondage such as slavery were prevalent in pre-independence Arunachal Pradesh (Thakur, 
2003).  Bondage in the tribal economy of Arunachal Pradesh, during the precolonial period, was mainly of 
two categories: firstly, there were hierarchical relations among the clans within the tribes and in some cases 
there were slaves from within a given tribal community (Deori, 1982: 55). Some of the slaves were from 
the neighbouring tribes who had been captured through war and predatory raids. In many cases the chiefs 
or nobles had rights over the labour of these dependent individuals or clans (Misra, 1979). Secondly, there 
were hierarchical relations among the tribes as well. Early anthropologists, for example, have described the 
Sulungs, now called Puroiks, as a ‘slave tribe’ (Deori, 1982). However, the tribal economy was not 
dependent upon the labour of the slaves alone (Sikdar, 1982: 16).  Thus, Mishra (1983: 1839) writes, ‘there 
was slavery of sorts in some tribes of the region, but there was no slave-based economy’.  
 
32 Elsewhere in India the processes of depeasantiasation was more pronounced as part of the processes of 
commercialisation of agriculture during the colonial period. For an analysis of the interlinked changes in 
land and credit market in the tribal regions of Chhotanagpur, see Mahapatra (1990).  
 
33 The typical contracts involved Rs 1000 of money advance to each of the workers against commitment to 
work in construction and quarrying. 
 
34 During the 1990s growth rates of agricultural production have worsened in most of the districts of 
Arunachal Pradesh. During the same period production and yield rates of all the foodgrains, except maize 
and pulses, registered negative growth rates. During 1980-81 to 2002-03, the growth rate of production and 
yield of rice in Tawang district was negative, while cereals production grew at a rate of 0.78 per cent per 
annum (Mishra, 2006). 
 




Variations in institutional arrangements across Villages 
Notes: (i) # A not well developed credit market means (a) ‘friends and relatives’ continue to remain the 
main source of informal credit, and (b) credit is often available with zero or substantially low interest rates. 
(ii) + High interest rate means sixty percent per annum or more. 













































































































































































































































































































The absence of legal entitlements over land for collateral, which is often cited as 
the reason behind weak penetration of the formal credit institutions in the region, has not 
come in the way of the emergence of informal credit institutions of various kinds. In 
many cases, the village councils, clans and even monasteries were reported to be the main 
sources of informal finance. Informal credit transactions were reported in many of the 
villages. In some it was mainly in the form of interest free and collateral free advances 
from friends and relatives but in others, land, ornaments and mithuns
35 were offered as 
collateral and the interest charged was found to be in the range of 36 to 60 percent per 
annum. In the villages in East Siang district which were fairly near to the town of 
Pasighat, there was a noticeable correspondence between relatively frequent land sales, 
the commercialisation of agricultural production and frequent personalised transactions in 
the informal credit market at high, exploitative interest rates. The explicit interest rate in 
loans (mostly in kind) advanced to sharecroppers and fixed produce tenants by the 
landlords was in the range of 50-60 per cent per annum. 
 
The Complexity of ‘Transitions’ to Agrarian Capitalism 
 
In our field research we discovered instances of institutional continuity, 
destruction, adaptation and innovation. In many of the villages, for example, the ‘village 
council’ continues to control land transactions. The informal authority of the council, or 
the gaon burah as its representative, has been effective in demarcating and safeguarding 
the ‘membership’ rule, i.e. who is and who is not a member of the micropolitical 
community
36. However, while this political institution is secure, labour institutions are 
being destroyed. In parts of the state where wet rice cultivation with migrant tenant and 
labourers has already become the norm, the traditional exchange labour system is 
disappearing. Yet even in villages where there is considerably less dependence on 
exchange labour and where agricultural production is substantially for the market, 
cooperative institutional arrangements are found to be significant in specific activities 
such as house construction as well as the collective provision of irrigation maintenance 
and some services like the watchman protection of crops from domestic and wild 
animals
37. In some of the villages, village councils have reinvented their role as 
organisers of labour groups. The elites deposit money with the council and the council 
mobilises community labour. There were instances where village councils have managed 
                                                 
35 The 'Mithun' (Bos Frontalis) a species of large cattle, which is found both in wild and semi-domesticated 
form, has great significance in the social and cultural life of the people of Arunachal Pradesh. Traditionally, 
the mithun was the medium of exchange and was a store and indicator of the wealth of a person. 
 
36 Not with standing the introduction of the panchayati raj institutions in the state, the gaon burah continues 
to be the functional head at the village level. It was common for most of the gaon burahs while responding 
to our queries regarding the number of households in the village to exclude the migrant tenants and state 
officials. 
 
37 The latter two types of collective behaviour, however, imply the monetisation of cooperative behaviour. 
In traditional cooperative labour mobilisation practices, the contribution was in kind, i.e. in terms of labour 
power, while in the new arrangements households contribute to a collective pool of cash and the work is 
carried out through market exchange. 
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to get contracts from the state, have completed the tasks with labour contributions from 
households and then distributed payments among the members after paying for the 
costs
38. Although the organisations and new institutions of state and market have been 
working towards weakening the authority of these institutional arrangements, village 
councils have also devised new ways of generating revenue. We came across a case 
where the village council manages to obtain rent from the National Hydro Power 
Corporation for the use of village land and water. Similarly, in a village in Tawang , 
college educated youth have been instrumental in devising effective quantitative 
restrictions on the extraction of forest products from collectively owned forests
39. In a 
nutshell then, the non-market institutional arrangements are not just withering away. For 
a variety of reasons, they continue to operate in old and new roles. 
 
The evidence described above clearly goes against the near universal consensus of 
social theorists that non-market institutional forms and processes would atrophy with the 
expansion and consolidation of the capitalist economy. Our evidence reveals that 
institutional adaptation, continuity and hybridity are as much integral to the emergence of 
the market economy as are the processes of creation of new institutions and demise of 
others. The reasons behind the persistence of such institutional diversity are complex, but 
a few tentative hypotheses are suggested by our field experience.  
 
Partly as a result of the deliberate policy of ‘preserving’ tribal institutions under 
the Nehru-Elwin policy of tribal protection, partly out of the political necessity of 
creating a loyal citizenry in a weakly-administered border State, located in a disturbed 
region, and partly by virtue of the recent nature of Arunachal’s status as a State the Indian 
state has followed a policy of gradual integration into the regime of economic citizenship, 
rather than one of imposing a uniform legal and administrative structure at one go. The 
preservation of ethnic identities has remained at the core of this administrative 
transformation.  With the emergence of the capitalist economy a powerful minority of 
local elite tribes and of elites within these tribes has developed with considerable power 
over the state apparatus. The economic basis of this class lies in access, through both 
lawful and unlawful means, to the resources of the state. Occupationally this group 
consists of politicians, businessmen and traders and bureaucrats. The expansion of the 
state bureaucracy, of construction and infrastructural activities undertaken by the military 
and the civil administration, the timber trade and general trading and business 
opportunities in consumption goods created by the emergence of the urban, service class 
has nurtured these elites. But the key to their economic base is their access to the 
resources of the state, which has depended in turn upon their capacity to exploit an 
ethnicised polity and society. Since outsiders cannot own property, local elites extract 
rent literally in four ways: from rented land, from house and business sites, from business 
licenses as well as from the state. The ability to extract rent both from the state and from 
                                                 
38 The gaon burah, and the Anchal Samiti Member (ASM) jointly keep the accounts, oversee the work and 
also distribute profits. 
 
39 As per the new rules, every household is allowed to collected house-building materials, including timber, 
once in a life time and one truck load of firewood every year from the village commons. 
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the various agents in the market, not only from migrant traders but also from labourers 
originating from outside the state, has depended upon the capacity of the elites to ‘speak 
on behalf of’ or represent their tribal communities. With growing competition for 
resources, the continuation of this ethnicised political governance is a necessary condition 
for the reproduction of this tribal elite
40. Not only does it enable them to have access to 
new and existing resources or ‘rents’, but also to safeguard them against competitors 
from among other  tribes of Arunachal Pradesh and from outside the State. These elites 
also protect themselves from the formal accountability mechanisms of the state
41. There 




For example, local elites use the informal transition to private property rights over 
land and forests noted earlier to seize and capture huge chunks of land. This primitive 
accumulation extends to urban land and land for plantations as well as for agricultural 
purposes. They have also been able to appropriate village commons like forests for 
private rent-seeking and for profit
43 (Mishra, 2001). The inadequate demarcation, 
recognition and safeguarding of communal property has ultimately resulted in an 
increasing concentration of income and wealth. When we asked about the ways through 
which local people ‘have become rich’ since independence, the answer was that while in 
the traditional order agriculture and animal wealth was considered to be the path to 
economic mobility, in the new (capitalist) scheme of things wealth is accumulated from 
trade and business (specifically the timber trade and government contracts, supply-orders, 
                                                 
40 The apparently strong presence of the Indian state, reflected through the heavy military and financial 
presence in the north-east India, coincides with its relative weakness in safe guarding the basic rights and 
security of the people in their everyday life (Baruah, 2004). The relative weakness of the state in 
safeguarding property rights and enforcing contracts typically creates scope for the emergence of ethnic 
groups to provide private means of securing property rights (Bates, 1998). Unlike in other northeastern 
states, where this has resulted in the proliferation of a number of insurgent groups defending the interest of 
specific ethnic communities, in Arunachal Pradesh, ‘it has led to competition and bargaining among 
different tribal groups to acquire a larger share of government’s resources – a form of ‘quiet pressure’ 
exercised from within the system’ (Mishra and Upadhyay, 2007). 
 
41 This happens in a variety of ways including selective application or non-application of existing legal 
provisions and also through relations of complicity. In the event of public complains about wrongdoing, 
community support becomes crucial for the elites to save themselves from prosecution.   
 
42 To argue that the elites have a vested interest in perpetuating such an institutional arrangement, however, 
does not necessarily mean that they are the only ones who have interests in preserving it. The common 
masses belonging to various tribes of the State also report that such institutional heterogeneity is in their 
best interest. Not only do such arrangements, to the extent that the nativist policies are implemented on the 
ground, give them an edge over migrant workers, traders and government officials from outside the state, 
but also – in the general framework of an ethnicised polity – the support of the elites is considered to be in 
the best interest of all members of the tribe. Since their claims over the state’s resources and benefits are 
mediated through these ‘public leaders’ they prefer not to weaken their strength by raising questions of 
accountability against them, even though they might be well aware of the corrupt practices of some of the 
elites. 
 
43 Such processes have been noted from many other areas of the northeastern region as well (Baruah, 
2003a; Fernandes, and Pereira, 2005, Roy Burman, 1989). 
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Another example of the link between accumulation and institutional diversity is 
the way the emergence of a wage labour market (consisting largely of migrant labour 
from outside the State, demand for which was generated by the state’s development and 
security apparatus) has been used by the elites to subvert traditional institutional 
mechanisms in order to plunder common property for private benefit. Many of the pre-
capitalist institutional mechanisms in the villages of Arunachal Pradesh were designed to 
regulate both current and future labour flows. Since labour was the main constraint facing 
this community-based agriculture, most institutional mechanisms, not withstanding their 
inter-tribe variations, emphasised the regulation and guarantee of its equitable 
distribution. And many of the other rules governing access to important assets like land, 
forest and pastures were based on the prior assumption of communal control over labour-
power. The rules governing access to forest products, including timber, were based on the 
membership-rule, on fulfilment of which there was no quantitative restriction on the 
amount of forest product that could be extracted by each member. In the past, such an 
arrangement did not result in over-exploitation or widespread inequality precisely 
because there was a restriction on the total amount of labour that could be mobilised for 
the purpose. But once a labour market and a cash economy emerged, those having access 
to surplus cash could mobilise outside labour and used their membership status to 
maximise the extraction of forest products. Something similar has also happened in the 
case of agricultural land: outside labour, either as tenants or casual labour, has been 
mobilised to clear and occupy increasingly large tracts of land. Baland and Platteau 
(1996: 30-31) have commented that if the rules of access are the only rules concerning 
resource-use in a context where natural resources are scarce and if the community cannot 
decide and enforce a set of rules of use, then the communal property regime degenerates 
into open access. In Arunachal Pradesh, while community institutions have managed to 
limit the number of users to some extent, the rules of use have not been very effectively 
enforced. In some cases at least, this has led to the emergence of a large landlord class, 
even in the absence of a high degree of commercialisation. 
 
There are, of course, significant political barriers to entry to the labour market in 
this State. The ‘Inner Line Permit’ system, imposed by the British Government to restrict 
the entry of outsiders into certain ‘restricted areas’ is still in force. Outsiders, even if 
Indian citizens, are not allowed to purchase land or built property in the state. These two 
institutional specificities together determine the growth in employment and migration 
patterns in rural Arunachal Pradesh
45. Apart from these two restrictions, trading licenses 
                                                 
44 Allowing for multiple answers, of the 11 villages under study, business and contracts (including timber 
business) were mentioned in 10 villages, agriculture was mentioned in five villages, (although its declining 
importance was also noted), government service was mentioned in four, politics and livestock were each 
mentioned in two villages in response to a query about the ways people in the village have become rich. 
 
45 These two restrictions, for example, discourage migrant labourers to move into interior rural areas, and 
hence they tend to crowd in urban areas, in rural settlements nearer to urban settlements and to a limited 
extent in the roadside ‘labour camps’ maintained by various state agencies, including the army. 
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are restricted to the local population of Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes (APST). 
Outsider businessmen, who may have acquired licences in the past through the 
negotiation of exemptions, find it increasingly difficult to renew their licences. Most of 
the business and trading firms are registered in the name of local people, but are 
effectively managed and run by capitalists from outside the State. In many cases, this 
creates substantial rents both for the licence holders for such enterprises and for the 
commercial capitalists for whom the permit sets up political conditions for monopoly or 
oligopoly
46. Maintaining the ethnicised character of the polity helps the consolidation of 
such rents
47. Ethnicised citizenship maintains the hold of tribal elites as representatives of 
the ‘community’.  
 
Given the tendency of the relatively wealthy rentier class to shift to non-
agricultural activities and urban sites, there is little productive re-investment of surplus in 
agriculture. But the growing value of land in a State where transactions in land markets 
are restricted provides reasons why the elites control as much land as possible. Land 
nearer to urban areas attracts high sales values as well as high rents, when sold or rented 
out for non-agricultural and residential use. So landowning elites invest in land control, 
mostly using migrant labourers as tenants on appropriated commons. This may involve 
heavy expenditures on land levelling, terracing, and construction of bunds etc. 
Occasionally attempts to enclave more land under cultivation has led to conflictual 
competition among and within tribal communities. These conflicts also affect the 
institutional mechanisms in diverse ways. The rules of access of the tenants and 
dependent labourers to the village commons are often unclear. We encountered cases 
where tenants and other migrants are levied extra fees by village councils, but in many 
cases they have de facto rights over forests, and councils fail to monitor the use of forest 
products or to enforce restrictions on their use. In some cases, the precise nature of the 
rights varied between the tenant households, depending upon the status and position of 
their landlord households in the local socio-political hierarchy.  
  
  The specificities of Arunachal Pradesh outlined above have influenced the nature 
of agrarian transformation in several ways. In the absence of data on land ownership and 
trends in capital formation in agriculture, in view of the substantial role of state transfers 
from New Delhi (including the multipliers of military expenditure – see below), and in 
view of the obvious limitations of our field investigations, it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which the  commercial non-agricultural economy is driving the process of 
commercialization and differentiation within agriculture. In parts of the State, investment 
in horticultural gardens, the cultivation of high value spices and aromatic crops suggests 
                                                 
46  There have been strong nativist demands, particularly by the student organisations, but also by the 
political parties and civil society groups, to protect the interest of the local population by reserving jobs, 
government contracts and trading licenses exclusively for the indigenous population. The politics of 
affirmative action by the state in the presence of such politicisation of ethnicity and ethnic difference has 
led rules of difference rather than civic rules (Baruah, 2003). In a recent move, the student organisations 
were also involved in the eviction of allegedly illegal migrants (mainly ‘Bangladeshis’) working as tenants. 
 
47 The politics of ethnicity and difference, though benefits the elites most, they are not the only 
beneficiaries of such an arrangement. Ordinary people also benefit from traditional and new networks of 
solidarity and patronage. 
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that farmers in the state have started responding to the local market signals. But this 
process of commercialization has only been possible because of state interventions of 
various kinds. Has a class of capitalist farmers emerged in the state? If it has, it is very 
small. Although a full answer requires a deeper study of agrarian relations the indication 
of our field research is that apart from the few tea gardens, horticultural estates and the 
vegetable farms on the urban fringes, Arunachal’s agriculture, by and large, is still for 
subsistence. Sporadic surpluses are sold locally (often at collectively fixed money prices 
or barter rates). The class of landowners who have acquired substantial chunks of land 
and have leased it out to migrant tenants is an increasingly visible form of production in 
the paddy-producing areas of the state. The few landlords with whom we conducted 
detailed interviews were developing neo-feudal relationships, including the imposition of 
private and arbitrary extractions in kind. 
 
The Role of the State in Agrarian Transformation 
 
In the context of the rice economies of South East Asia, Hart has argued that 
‘State patronage is central to the understanding of agrarian processes. It not only 
influences forms of extraction and accumulation, but also generates tensions and 
contradictions that constitute important sources of change and differentiation’ (1989: 31). 
 
In Arunachal Pradesh, the state has influenced the process of agrarian 
transformation in several ways, some of which were not necessarily deliberate. Firstly, 
the state played an important role in creating and expanding a regulated capitalist 
economy. The state policies of discouraging shifting cultivation and providing incentives 
for ‘modern’ technology hastened the process of transition to a private property regime, 
although it was never explicitly recognised as a policy objective. Secondly, by its 
military, administrative and development interventions, the state has created a labour 
market in a pre-capitalist social formation. The specificity of this state-induced labour 
market was through the in-migration of outside labour rather than through the 
dispossession of producers from their means of production. At least in the initial phase, 
there has been a local disjunction in the emergence of wage labour in agriculture and the 
internal differentiation of the peasantry, though the wage labour force was created by 
differentiation and primitive accumulation elsewhere in South Asia. Thirdly, the role of 
state patronage and protection in creating large agricultural estates can hardly be 
overemphasised. Almost all the privately owned tea gardens and large horticultural 
estates are owned by powerful politicians and their relatives
48. Often these owners have 
received substantial support from the state, either in the form of direct subsidies, through 
assistance in marketing, or through informal appropriation and virement of the labour of 
government employees. In other words, the state is deeply implicated in the primary 
accumulation of the tribal elites
49. Finally, the social origins of the large landowners in 
                                                 
48 Among the tea estate owners are the families of prominent politicians and chieftain families. The large 
number of migrant labourers in these estates do not get many of the benefits enjoyed by the labourers in the 
tea gardens of Assam, but are tied through a range of patron-client relations with their employers.  
 
49 The other form of primitive accumulation that has been happening is through the expansion of 
infrastructure, reserved forests and land enclosures for military security and administrative purposes. So far 
this has not resulted in large-scale eviction of self-producers mainly because of the favourable land-man 
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the State demonstrates the significance of state intervention and the politics of the 
creation of the large landlord class. Some of the large landowners (although the 
magnitude of ‘large’ differs with altitude) were nobles, chiefs or religious heads in the 
tribal orders, but a majority of them are now contractors, politicians and state officials. 
Access to the resources of the state, often through corrupt means, has been the main 
source of the illegal resources commanded by the emerging elites. Influential individuals 
and families in formal as well as informal structures of governance are often incorporated 
to secure the loyalty of local tribal voters. Accountability structures have been weak and 
there has been hardly any independent public scrutiny of the activities of bureaucrats and 
the politicians. This facilitated a process of elite capture of the development process. 
With legal restrictions on the purchase of land, the mobility of labour and the issuing of 
trading and business licences, government contracts and licences were increasingly 
rationed to the local elites, some of whom accumulated capital while others earned rents 
by out-sourcing their licences and contract to third parties. For the politicians of 
Arunachal, this has been a key instrument of patronage and control.  
 
A second source of surplus for the local elites, until recently, was the huge 
‘profits’ from timber trade. Although timber trade was by and large controlled by the 
large-scale business from outside the State, the local business class, as junior partners and 
facilitators, managed to corner a substantial share for themselves. Some of them invested 
the surplus in establishing sawmills, plywood factories and transportation businesses. 
Although in the first instance the timber trade appears to be independent of the state, the 
manner in which the state allowed the plundering of the commonly owned forests for 
private profit makes it clear that state support and protection was essential for the timber 
trade. While the forest department of the state government retained control over the 
supply of permits to cut trees, these permits were issued with such frequency and under 
such a framework of political patronage that community control over forests remained at 
best a minor irritant both for the traders belonging to indigenous tribal groups as well as 
those originating from outside Arunachal. Against the backdrop of very low local 
revenue generation, the revenue earned from the timber trade was a non-trivial source of 
earning for the government
50.  
 
Significant aspects of surplus generation in the local economy are that firstly, 
surplus has been created largely outside agriculture; and secondly, access to political 
power and resources of the state acted as key factors in the creation and sustenance of this 
surplus flow. These are the further peculiarities
51  resulting from the prominence of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ratio. However, this is going to loom larger in future as the State is going to construct several large and 
medium hydropower projects. 
 
50 The contribution of forestry to the NSDP of the State declined from around 21 percent in 1970-71 to 
around 9 percent during the early 1990s. Just before the restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court, it was 
nearly 11 percent in 1996-97, after which it has declined to 4.3 per cent 2004-5. In absolute terms, forest 
revenue was nearly 49 crores rupees in 1995-96. 
 
51 To be sure, the significance of access to state power in the structures of accumulation within agriculture 
is a feature of third world agriculture that has been widely noticed and commented upon. In many other 
states of India, access to political power and state structures consolidated the position of the landowning 
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state as the key agent of economic transformation. In Thai and Indonesian contexts, 
observers have noted that the rural elites act as, ‘political and economic agents of the 
state in the countryside and are co-opted into the larger structure of power as preferred 
but dependent clients. Their access to subsidised credit, inputs, licenses, guaranteed 
prices and so forth stems not so much from their ability to sway agricultural policy in 
their favour through direct influence, but rather from the services they render to larger 
centres of accumulation by helping to police the countryside’ (Hart, 1989: 33). Much of 
this description is relevant to the case of Arunachal Pradesh, so far as the relationship 
between the state and the tribal elites is concerned, although surplus generation from 
agriculture itself is far less developed. 
 
These forms of agrarian relations also create the need to maintain social networks and 
support structures.  Turton (1989b) observes that in rural Thailand a great deal of the 
expenditure on travel, social events, feasts and so forth is in effect ‘geared to establishing 
and reproducing social relations with strategic superiors and subordinates in order to 
enhance political and economic position, to secure lucrative offices and contracts, to gain 
protection for illegal economic activities, and to accumulate political and economic 
clients’ (Turton, 1989b: 83). ‘These activities are clearly designed to ensure the 
conditions of accumulation in the long run’ (Hart, 1989:35). The traditional horizontal 
reciprocities among people of the same social strata and the vertical reciprocities among 
nobles and commoners, which have been prevalent in different parts of Arunachal 
Pradesh in varying degrees and forms, have acquired new meanings and roles in the 
transition to capitalism
52. Although the state has given formal recognition to the 
traditional institutional mechanisms, such as community laws
53, the state in its various 
‘developmental’ activities (such as building roads, providing incentives to ‘progressive’ 
farmers, issuing land occupation certificates to individuals) has played an active role in 
undermining the historical bases of authority and control of the tribal political 
                                                                                                                                                 
classes and facilitated their hold over the rural economy, but agricultural surplus remained the main source 
of income and (re)investment for the landowning class for a considerable period during the agrarian 
transition. In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, however, access to economic rents (mostly in the non-
agricultural economy) and political power has been the main source of the surplus which was used to 
expand the area owned by large landowners. 
 
52 Interestingly the forms of celebration of many  tribal festivals have undergone substantial changes in past 
years. Increasingly these festivals are celebrated as public festivals under the patronage of the more 
resourceful members of the community. They not only serve as an occasion to cement ties among   
members of the community who have moved out of their villages, but in the competitive politics of 
difference and recognition among different ethnic groups, they also serve the purpose of identity assertion. 
 
53 The official web-site of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh claims that ‘Arunachal Pradesh is not a 
linguistic state. It is an ethnic state inhabited by colourful tribal people of diverse culture and lifestyle. All 
of them have their own unique culture and traditions. They also have customary laws and a time tested 
dispute resolution mechanism. The disputes in tribal societies are resolved by a system of administration of 
justice founded on customs and customary laws of each tribe by the Village Council. Though, there were 
no written rules for administration of tribal villages, but the customs and traditions were almost compatible 
with the modern concepts of jurisprudence…The council derived their authority from the expression of the 
will and power of the people. They had the support of both social and supernatural. Thus the concept of 
parliamentary democracy is not new to the tribal society’. http://arunachalpradesh.nic.in/govt.htm 
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institutions. As the expansion and consolidation of the state administration at the 
grassroots has continued, access to state resources in the form of services, contracts, 
subsidies and other incentives, became increasingly central to the strategies of 
accumulation and survival of rural households. On the one hand, to the extent that access 
to authority and power in the tribal hierarchy influenced access to state resources, the 
sphere of influence of the tribal political institutions expanded to these ‘non-traditional’ 
areas. On the other hand, the primary site for resource-conflicts was no longer confined to 
the land, forests and water that used to be controlled by tribal institutions. The straddling 
of customary and state regulative regimes is increasingly part of the  newly emerging 
elites’ strategies for political and economic consolidation involving forging alliances, 
maintaining patron-client relations and minimising dissent from within the community- 
all of which are vital for maintaining accumulation in the long run. 
 
Conclusions  
Returning to the three significant dimensions of the agrarian economy of 
Arunachal which we mentioned at the outset – the distinctiveness of the transition in 
mountain regions; the diversity of institutions and the role of the state - the field research 
reported here suggests that the transition to capitalism of the agriculture of a mountain 
region like this takes a distinctive form due to five major factors. The first is the sheer 
variety of physical resources created by the range of temperatures, aspects, altitudes, soils 
and precipitation whose use value is being transformed into exchange value through the 
penetration of markets – a process which has been found to be highly uneven. The second 
is the physical cum technological limits to expanded reproduction in fragile agrarian 
environments, which in turn triggers the out-migration of (young) skilled labour. The 
third is the high cost of the process of capitalist development due the remoteness of 
mountain regions from urban/national effective demand, which commercial agricultural 
markets have to serve - and thus the dependence of mountain regions on remittances, on 
state transfers for productive investment and on local effective demand for (imported) 
consumer goods. The fourth is the resistance of mountain agriculture to energy intensive 
inputs based directly or indirectly on petro-chemicals - and thus the enduring importance 
to agricultural production of human labour and energy. The fifth is conditioned by the 
way modern states use mountains as frontiers and militarize them. Even when military 
food supplies are brought in by the army from other regions - as in the case of Arunachal, 
the military creates multipliers through ancillary expenditure which may act as local 
incentives for the commercial production of food, spices and groceries. However, 
production for a local market – in the marked absence of the extraction of surplus from 
wage labour or through interest, and without productive reinvestment in agriculture - is a   
restricted kind of capitalist relationship. This is in no sense to argue that a mountain state 
like Arunachal is not profoundly incorporated into the global capitalist system, but it is to 
argue that the modes of incorporation are not primarily through its agricultural 
production. 
 
Second, the heterogeneity of institutional arrangements that characterise the rural 
economy of Arunachal Pradesh may contribute to a more general understanding of the 
processes of economic transformation under global capitalism. Institutional diversity 
appears to be a pervasive feature of this process. The older forms of institutional 
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arrangement for the rural economy are not simply being replaced by new, market 
institutions; instead the institutional transitions are far more varied. Some of the old 
institutional arrangements weaken and new institutions emerge, but many of the non-
market institutional arrangements persist, albeit in different forms, serving new regulative 
purposes in the emerging capitalist economy. There is no necessary correspondence 
between the emerging commercialisation of the different productive forces of the 
agrarian economy. These uneven processes of institutional diversity, hybridity and 
interdependence are deeply influenced by existing and emerging power relations. In this 
essay, we have attempted to demonstrate the manipulation of such institutional diversity 
for the accumulation trajectories of local elites. The politics of ethnicity and difference 
that has been used by them to safeguard their own interests vis-à-vis the state and also to 
protect themselves from competition – both local and outside - will endure as a key 
attribute of the political economy of Arunachal’s development process in general and a 
driver of Arunachal’s agrarian transition in particular. 
 
A further feature of Arunachal’s institutional unevenness and the early stage of its 
transition pertains to primitive accumulation. Often treated as an obsolete feature of the 
era of early capitalism, primitive accumulation emerges as an important characteristic of 
the on-going process of agrarian and non-agrarian capitalist development. Primitive 
accumulation - also  translated as original or primary accumulation – has two elements. 
The one most visible in Arunachal at present is the private seizure of the means of 
production: the creation of private property which is historically and logically prior to 
productive investment. This is taking three forms. One gives rise to productive 
investment in horticulture and tea plantations, the second is carried out by the state for 
land-extensive infrastructure (owned privately as well as publicly), while the third 
involves the large-scale private sequestration of forested land with no change of use. 
Although the processes and mechanisms through which the new land enclosures are 
created have context-specific implications for land-owners, they have coercion in 
common. State power remains decisive in this rural transition and the ways in which state 
power manifests itself are becoming more extensive in the present ’neo-liberal’ context 
than in the past. The second element in primitive accumulation, the dispossession of 
labour from the means of production so that it is ‘free’ to sell its labour power, does not 
relate in an exact way to land seizure, due to local differences in population-land ratios. It 
is being achieved at a distance for, while demand for wage labour is being created and 
agriculture is shedding labour, for the most part the labour shed is educated and migrates-
out while the wage labour demanded is abjectly poor and being forced to migrate-in. 
 
When the state is the prime mover of capitalist transition, it assumes distinctive 
forms. They are the third dimension we explored. The capitalist economy has expanded 
in ways subservient to the interests of the state, at least in the early contemporary phase. 
Although the evidence gathered here allows only a tentative conclusion, capital, in a 
remote and ‘backward’ region like Arunachal Pradesh, strengthens rentier state power. 
As well as searching for cheap labour and raw materials and expanding the market, 
capitalism has also generated forms of differentiation that have encouraged the 
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emergence of neo-feudal production relations.
54 While neo-feudal contractual 
arrangements strengthen and consolidate state power in this border state, this rentier class 
fraction is heavily dependent upon state investment, salaries, and resources plundered 
from the state for its survival and reproduction. Predatory property in general and 
predatory landed property in particular has certainly not vanished. 
 
  Returning finally to the questions asked at the outset about the kind of agrarian 
transition underway in this remote mountain frontier region and thus to the (ir)relevance 
of the agrarian question itself, our answers depend on admitting the vital role of the state 
in the non-agricultural sector and the roles of both in driving change in the agrarian 
economy. The incorporation of Arunachal into India’s capitalist development has been 
significantly determined by the consolidation of the state apparatus, both civil and 
military. The development of the non-agricultural economy, which is dominated by the 
expanding service sector, infrastructure and public administration, has resulted in its 
rapid integration with markets beyond the state. In terms of the consumption patterns of 
the urban population, the linkages between capitalists from outside the state and the local 
tribal elites, the flow of goods (even some food), services and capital, and the growth of a 
migrant wage labour force, the non-agricultural economy is fully integrated with the 
Indian -  and to some extent even with the global -  circuits of capitalism. Bernstein’s 
argument that the agrarian question has simply been by-passed appears to be supported 
by the pace of the development of capitalism outside agriculture. Indeed the results of the 
NSS 59
th round data (NSSO 2006)  support our field research findings that though the 
non-agricultural economy has been more or less incorporated into the capitalist system, 
agriculture is far from fully transformed. The agrarian economy is on a slower transition, 
one moving in the same direction as the rest, but one in which agriculture currently 
services little but itself. In terms of the development of wage labour, the 
commercialisation of other input and output markets, the investment of surplus in 
productive technology etc., the agrarian system continues to exhibit non-capitalist 
production relations. Yet Arunachal’s agrarian society would find it very hard to 
reproduce itself for long without the state and capitalist markets. And at the same time, 
predatory land seizures, estates and plantations dot the landscape, local landless wage 
labour emerges alongside share-tenancies and the peasantry shows signs of early 
differentiation. Even though, as we understand them, the underlying dynamics of these 
processes are not those of the classical models of transition to capitalism, our field 
evidence points to the diverse pathways of the transition towards the subsumption of 
labour to capital in agriculture. The existence of institutional constraints to the kind of 
rapid imposition of capitalist production relations that has characterised the non-
                                                 
54 Adduci  (this issue) has explained the recent changes in the political economy of Orissa in terms of 
existence of a neo-rentier class that has come to dominate the State’s economy. For this neo-rentier class, 
she argues, ‘the process of extraction of rent was intimately linked to the control of the state apparatus, 
through which they control the state’s natural resources. ..While serving the needs of the capitalist 
development process at the national level, the neo-rentier class in Orissa managed to find within it the 
social spaces which allowed their very reproduction’. Rao (1995, 234-5) earlier noted the fact that capital, 
serving the interest of the state, had tended to create neo-feudal production relations in the tribal regions of 
Orissa.  Our evidence is not extensive enough to support conclusions about a significant neo-feudal class; 
but it certainly indicates the existence of neo-feudal forms of production relations in agriculture and rentier 
activity surrounding the state alongside emergent forms of mercantile and productive capitalism. 
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agricultural economy only reinforces the significance of the classical agrarian question, 
as Byres has argued. It still remains to be resolved. All aspects of the agrarian question 
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